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ABSTRACT 
 
In recent times, there has been a strong call for a greater focus on the ‘relationship 
management’  function of public relations.  This exploratory study seeks to contribute to this 
movement within public relations scholars and professionals by exploring the relationship 
management aspects of financial public relations.  Still a relatively new discipline, financial 
public relations faces many challenges in both the planning and implementation of 
communication programs for shareholders.  The increasingly competitive nature of the 
world’s financial markets and the changing profile of the traditional shareholder are raising 
important issues for financial public relations professionals.  This study explores the ways 
listed companies understand their relationships with their shareholders and the way such 
understanding influences the communicative practice of the listed companies.  Data were 
collected from seven Australian publicly listed companies via interviews.  A 
conceptualisation of four major roles played by a listed company in building and maintaining 
its relationship with its shareholders is provided.  Two roles that the listed company believes 
the shareholder plays in maintaining the relationship are also identified.  Challenges to the 
roles are identified, including the changing profile of the Australian shareholder, the influence 
of new technology, and growing shareholder activism.   
 
Changing Roles for Changing Times? How Listed Companies Interpret Their Role as 
Communicator. 
 
Introduction 
 
There is growing recognition among public relations scholars and practitioners of the 
importance of managing relationships between organisations and publics (Ledinghan & 
Bruning, 1998; Jackson, 1998).  For publicly listed companies, the focus is on managing 
relationships with their shareholders.  A recent survey across European and American public 
companies demonstrated the importance of this relationship, with senior management listing 
shareholders as the first priority for their organisation (White & Mazur, 1995, p. 7).  
 
Building relationships with shareholders must be done within the constraints of a regulatory 
environment which governs information disclosure (see for example, Australian Stock 
Exchange Listing Rules, 1996).  Practitioners are constantly balancing the communication 
needs of the organisation and stakeholders within this environment.  This balance, likened by 
Thompson (1996, May) to ‘sailing through uncharted waters’, places additional pressure on 
practitioners and is likely to require different approaches to practice than in other areas of 
public relations.  This study explores the sets of behaviours used by a group of financial 
communicators to manage the company-shareholder relationship, and the underlying 
assumptions which guide such behaviour.  A typology of roles played by the financial 
communicator is proposed to explain the current sets of behaviour, as well as to identify 
opportunities for change.   
 
Uncovering Assumptions:  The Study 
 
This qualitative study of financial communicators in seven major organisations took an 
exploratory approach to understanding the assumptions guiding the listed company-
shareholder relationship.  An interpretive paradigm was selected, as one of the key features of 
qualitative research is the ability to examine relationships within a system or culture 
(Janesick, 1998). Qualitative interviewing was used to collect data. The qualitative interview 
is one of the favourite methodological tools of the qualitative researcher (Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994) because of its ability to achieve ‘crucial qualitative objectives within a manageable 
methodological context’ (McCracken, 1988, p. 163).  It also allows the researcher to 
‘understand the sensitive relationships’ (Lindlof, 1995, p. 5) which engage the informant, 
which was a key focus for this study. 
 
Interviews were held with company officers responsible for shareholder communication.  The 
informants were purposefully selected to best answer the research question (Creswell, 1994).  
Given the different approaches to shareholder communication within Australian companies 
(Sullivan, 1997), informants held a variety of positions including chief executive, company 
secretary, legal counsel, investor relations manager and public relations manager.  From the 
interviews, certain patterns, categories and themes were drawn and interpreted (Creswell, 
1994).  Coding of the interview data followed McCracken’s guidelines (1988) on the 
development of analytic categories.  This approach allows the researcher to progress from the 
particular data gathered upward through five successive stages of reflection and analysis to 
more general observations. 
 
A Framework for Analysis 
 
Managing relationships between listed companies and shareholders falls within the 
responsibilities of financial public relations (Jackson & Center, 1990; Grunig & Grunig, 
1992).  Sometimes termed investor relations (Mahoney, 1991) and financial relations (Seitel, 
1992), financial public relations is responsible for the ‘building of a relationship between a 
company and its shareholders’ (Marcus & Wallace, 1997, p. 19).   
 
The increasingly competitive nature of the world’s financial markets is driving a search for 
improved means of managing shareholder relationships.  Trusler (1993) argues that society 
has moved from a manufacturing to a service economy.  Critical for survival in this new 
environment are long term relationships (Tuominen, 1997). This changing environment has 
particular implications for listed companies.  Companies must encourage shareholders to take 
a longer term view to their investment (Trusler, 1993), overcoming wherever possible, the 
short-term ‘deal-orientated, volume-based mentality’ (p. 49) of investors.  Proactive 
communication is seen as a mechanism to help achieve this shift in focus, building 
shareholder loyalty while still recognising the importance placed by shareholders on continual 
return on investment (Tuominen, 1997; Trusler, 1993). 
 
Shareholder relationship management must also recognise the changing nature of the 
shareholder body. There is a global trend towards greater share ownership among the adult 
population (The Clemenger Report, 1998).  In Australia, private share ownership has 
increased from approximately 15 percent in 1991 to 40 percent of the adult population in 
1998 (Australian Shareownership Surveys: 1998, 1994).  While institutional investors remain 
the dominant players in the market, approximately 21% of shares in Australian listed 
companies are now held by individual investors, representing approximately $100 billion 
(Peacock, 1998).   
 
Shareholder activism is also creating challenges for financial communicators. Shareholder 
activism is growing and predictions are that it will continue to grow (Dunlop, 1998; Johnson, 
1998; Smith, 1998).  Fleisher (1998) attributes the growing activism to better informed 
shareholders, empowered by new communication technologies.  Describing shareholders as 
empowered brings into question the role that shareholders do and could play in the companies 
in which they invest.  Shareholders have often been portrayed as powerless (Deetz, 1992), 
tending to be ‘disinclined and/or unable, to influence corporate decisions of the companies 
they “own” ’(p. 211).  How listed companies will adapt to a possible recasting of the 
shareholder role is yet to be explored fully, however, the need to change is being emphasised 
in many industry publications (see for example, Investor Relations, 1998). 
 
The desire to attract shareholders in an increasingly competitive market has refocused 
attention on the role of financial public relations in managing relations with shareholders.  
Leitch & Neilson (1997) argue that in public relations theory, ‘the form of the relation has 
taken precedence over the function or purpose of the relational strategy’  (p. 26).  This leads 
to a focus on the forms of communication that occur between organisations and publics 
without detailed consideration of key dimensions of the organisation-public relationship 
including ‘power, strategy, objectives, and the manifold ways each articulates and 
overdetermines, constructs and deconstructs, organises and disorganises, the other’ (p. 26).  In 
financial public relations, this focus can be seen in the predominance of literature that guides 
practitioners in the implementation of financial communication programs (see for example, 
Marcus & Wallace, 1997; Mahoney, 1991).  While very useful for practitioners, the 
underlying assumption of these guides is that listed companies will have a relationship with 
their shareholders and the focus then shifts to how to implement the programs.  Absent from 
the professional literature is any detailed analysis of the underlying assumptions of the 
relationship that the company has with its shareholders.  Therefore, an opportunity exists to 
identify and challenge such assumptions and the framework which guides current practice.  
 
The concept of a worldview helps provide a framework in which to think about and define the 
practice of public relations (Grunig & White, 1992).  A worldview provides a ‘conceptual 
framework through which perceptions are screened’ (Meehan, 1968, p. 41) as it represents a 
‘set of images and assumptions about the world’ (Kearney, 1984, p. 10). The assumptions 
driving the existing listed company-shareholder relationship can be explored through the 
analysis of the worldview that provides the conceptual framework for the organisation.  
Kearney (1984) suggests that specific worldviews result in certain patterns of behaviour and 
not in others.  Thus, the governing worldview provides important insights into existing 
behaviour and the possibility of different behaviour occurring through the adoption of an 
alternative worldview (Grunig & White, 1992).   
 
Grunig (1989) suggests that the traditional perspective of public relations practice favours an 
asymmetrical worldview.  Fundamental to this worldview is the belief that the organisation, 
or its dominant coalition, ‘knows best’ (p.32) and publics would benefit from co-operating 
with the organisation on its terms.  Supporting this view is a closed system of communication 
where information flows out of, and not in to, an organisation (Grunig, 1989, p. 32-33).  
Research (Newsom et al, 1996; Dozier et al, 1995; Grunig, 1989) has shown that the 
asymmetrical models of public relations practice are widely used by listed companies in their 
shareholder communication.  These models allow the listed company to control the 
communication process (Grunig, 1984), while trying to persuade shareholders to accept the 
company’s position (McElreath, 1996). 
 
The growth in shareholder activism (Dunlop, 1998; Smith, 1998) is demonstrating  
dissatisfaction with the current functioning of the listed company-shareholder relationship.  
Therefore, it is timely to explore alternative worldviews that may guide different approaches 
to communicative practice.  The proposed alternative to the asymmetrical worldview is the 
symmetrical worldview (Grunig, 1989).  Central to the symmetrical worldview is the belief in 
an open system between organisations and publics which freely exchanges information (p. 
38).  These exchanges require the participation of both the organisation and its publics as the 
symmetrical worldview recognises the interdependence of both parties (Grunig & White, 
1992).   
 
Both the asymmetrical and symmetrical worldviews can inform the relationship building 
process.  However, the symmetrical worldview has been identified as the best process for 
building long-term, mutually beneficial relationships (McElreath, 1996).  Within listed 
companies, there is significant interest in promoting the ‘long term’ nature of the relationship 
between the company and its shareholders (Tuominen, 1997). Therefore, a symmetrical 
worldview may provide guidance for practitioners interested in enhancing the relationships 
their companies have with shareholders.   
 
A shift to a different worldview has major implications for practice, including the role that the 
publics play in the organisation-public relationship.  Participation of publics in the 
asymmetrical worldview is limited.  The asymmetrical worldview suggests that the 
organisation partakes of one-way communication which disseminates information (Grunig & 
Grunig, 1992), that is, it undertakes a ‘monologue’ (p. 289).  The symmetrical worldview, 
however, requires substantial participation by publics.  Communication within the 
symmetrical worldview is two-way communication which exchanges information (Grunig & 
Grunig, 1992) through ‘dialogue’ (p. 289) between the parties.   
 
The concepts of the asymmetrical and symmetrical worldviews will be used to review the sets 
of behaviour which emerged from this study. 
 
Playing Out the Relationship Roles:  Research Findings and Implications 
 
Earlier studies (see for example, Broom & Smith, 1979; Reagan et al, 1990; Dozier et al, 
1995) have identified roles played by public relations professionals.  These roles help to 
describe the many complex functions within the overall public relations service and the 
different approaches to practice by individuals.   
 
For the purpose of this paper, it is useful to consider the conceptualisation of the relationship 
between the listed company and its shareholders in terms of the sets of behaviour found in the 
companies studied.  These sets of behaviour emerged as a typology of company roles and 
shareholder roles. Sub-roles of each category were also identified.  Within the company role, 
four major sub-roles were identified:  informer, performer, leader and nurturer.  While 
multiple roles were used to manage the shareholder relationship, the assumptions and 
requirements of any one role had the potential to conflict with the other roles played by the 
same financial communicator.  Therefore, conflicting and often contradictory practices can 
reside in the one manager, as was evidenced in the interviews. 
 
Two major shareholder sub-roles were identified:  participator and outsider.  These sub-roles 
helped to explain the companies’ expectations of their shareholders and, therefore, provided a 
support base for the company roles. 
 
The Informer 
 
The informer role reflected the traditional view of financial public relations as communicating 
relevant information to the market (Smith, 1993; Mahoney, 1991).  
 
Informant 2:  The role is aimed at realising the true value of the company in the 
market place…making sure the message on what the company is trying to achieve is 
passed on and the market is well informed.   
 
Supporting Mahoney’s description (1991) of the financial communicator’s role as ‘stepping 
through a quagmire’ (p. 389), the informer role required a constant balance between 
disclosing information to ensure a favourable rating in the market and the need to protect 
commercially sensitive information.  The disclosure regime was seen as the base of the 
communicative practice.   However, the bureaucratic nature of the statutory regime 
discouraged companies from providing non-required information.    
 
Informant 7:  We have a box and we tick it.  It is prescriptive.  Do we think outside 
the box? No.  
 
Companies consciously providing more than was required believed that their disclosure 
culture provided benefits in the way the organisation was viewed by and developed 
relationships with its shareholders.   
 
Informant 3:  I don’t think we would have won many brownie points if we had 
produced something that was very basic and just met the statutory requirements.  So 
we try and meet those requirements but at the same time give an image of being a 
professional organisation.  
 
Control over the external environment was sought through the informer role. The companies 
sought to control the information process as it was perceived to be integral to the market’s 
interpretation of performance. While the desire to exert control over the valuation process was 
not articulated by the informants in this study, the informants talked negatively about the 
opposite of such control – surprises.  Surprises were seen to develop from uncertainty in the 
market and, as one of the informants explained, ‘no one likes surprises’ (Informant 7).  The 
desire for control can grow from a desire to lessen the uncertainty surrounding actions of 
another entity (Heath, 1997), as ‘uncertainty is uncomfortable’ (p. 294).  A proactive informer 
role helped to reduce the level of uncertainty in the market and, therefore, reduced the 
opportunity for surprises to occur.   
 
The informer role also achieved control by reducing the level of questioning of the 
organisation.  By disclosing more information, the companies believed they could pre-empt 
any shareholder questions.  This suggested that the questioning of the company by 
shareholders was viewed negatively and represented a form of activism against the company.   
 
Deetz (1992) suggests that the traditional view of shareholders as ‘powerless’ (p. 211) is  
brought about by the withholding of necessary information and the release of information that 
is greatly influenced in its construction by the management group.  Through the informer role, 
company management provided information to the market to meet what it had determined as 
the shareholders’ needs.  The choice of the level of information revealed was clearly 
identified by one of the informants.   
 
Informant 7: You do have to draw the line between how much information you give 
them, because it is not information which is publicly available and that is our 
choice…They (analysts and shareholders) would get as much information as they can 
but we have to control that information. 
 
The future fulfilment of the informer role was being questioned.  A need for shareholders to 
become more responsible for information seeking rather than just information receiving was 
identified, with the change being aided by technological innovation.  This would require the 
shareholders to take a more active interest in the informing process. 
 
The informer role reflected many aspects of the asymmetrical worldview.  In most cases, the 
organisation determined what it believed was important for the shareholders to know and then 
designed communication material to distribute the selected information.  The company’s 
position was central to all aspects of the relationship.  Control was sought throughout the 
various dimensions of the informer role, thereby protecting the company’s position.   
 
The Performer 
 
The performer role highlighted the tension between the owners of the company and the ‘hired 
managers’  (Anderson & Epstein, 1997).  Shareholders are constantly seeking new ways to 
evaluate the performance of companies and much of the information used to make these 
assessments is released by the companies.   
 
Informant 3:  Communication is an ongoing exercise in explaining how the company 
is performing, what it is doing, what are its goals, objectives, things like that.  
 
The performer role was multi-dimensional.  On the first level, it showed accountability to 
shareholders by achieving and reporting on current financial performance. Shareholders 
placed pressure on the company to ‘deliver the goods year in and year out’ (Informant 7).  
This element of the performer role was closely associated with the informer role.  
 
The second level involved setting performance expectations through communicative practice.   
This required communicating in a less certain environment than the first level and brought 
with it the consequences of not achieving the expectations being set.   Financial performance 
was not seen as an objective measure but involved performance assessment in line with 
shareholder expectations.  Therefore, communication played an important role in setting 
expectations and demonstrating how such expectations had been met.   Performing was 
important, but being seen to perform was equally as important.  Here, the communication role 
was vital in constructing and managing perceptions of the company’s performance and the 
way it demonstrated such performance to its shareholders as part of its accountability 
obligations.   
 
Whereas the informer role was a positive function, the performer role was described in more 
negative terms, involving the concepts of fear, threats and danger.  While these concepts may 
be easily associated with a non-performing company, they appeared to invade the culture of 
strongly performing companies as well.  Strong performances created positive feelings on 
achievements as well as negative feelings about the consequences if record performances 
could not be continually achieved. Shareholder activism was seen as placing more pressure on 
the listed companies to perform, and therefore, enhanced the negative attributes associated 
with the performer role. 
 
Informant 7:  I think there is a recognition that if you don’t continue to deliver, you 
will either become a target for a takeover or your employment as an employee and the 
future of the company as you know it may be jeopardised as such. 
 
The performer role reflected aspects of both the asymmetrical and symmetrical worldviews.  
In some cases, communication strategies were used to try and persuade the shareholders to 
accept the performance standards as set by the company.  In other cases, performance 
standards were negotiated through open communication exchanges between the company and 
its shareholders, primarily the institutional shareholders.  However, these exchanges were still 
influenced by the generally asymmetrical approach of the informer role, which limited the 
ability for true exchange to occur.   
  
The Leader 
 
The leader role was characterised by the personal influence of those in leadership positions 
and the philosophy driving decision-making by those leaders on behalf of shareholders.   
 
The personification of the leader role was achieved through the involvement of the Chairman 
and/or Chief Executive Officer.  Strong leaders were seen to promote shareholder confidence.  
 
Informant 4:  It is their program.  It is really understood by all the shareholders that 
the Chairman and Managing Director have a close knowledge and interest in what 
investors think and they understand and are able to communicate to shareholders what 
is happening in the company.  
  
Two possible explanations for the leader role were provided, reflecting the approach to 
organisational decision-making.  The first view reflected the privilege given to the company’s 
managers by shareholders.  This recognised the assumed power of shareholders to remove 
that privilege at any time.  The alternative view reflected the right of management to lead the 
company in the direction they believed best. Managers would strive to achieve a good 
performance for shareholders, but if the shareholders were dissatisfied, they could depart from 
the company by selling their shares.   
 
Informant 4:  If shareholders are dissatisfied with the job management are doing, I 
suppose they have clear choices.  One is to sell the shares. 
 
This view promotes the impersonal nature of investing, where having shareholders is 
important to an entity, but the particular shareholders themselves are not important, and 
appears in conflict with the move towards ‘long term interaction’ (Tuominen, 1997, p. 303) 
between companies and their investors.   
 
The informants who subscribed to the ‘right to manage’ philosophy believed that the 
communication process involved informing shareholders of decisions made, that is, ‘telling 
them what we have done’ (Informant 4).  For the informants who subscribed to the privilege 
of leadership view, the leader role was to persuade the shareholders that the right decision had 
been taken.  Communicative practice was used to ‘ justify what we have done’ (Informant 5) 
and ‘gain support from explaining why things have happened’ (Informant 2). 
 
The demonstration of the company’s internal decision-making ability reflected the promotion 
of the ‘elite’ in the asymmetrical worldview (Grunig, 1989).  Belief in the role of the ‘elite’ 
allows the organisation to support the view that the leaders of the organisation ‘know best’ (p. 
33) and therefore power and authority should be centralised in the hands of such elite.  The 
presentation of a strong leader role, while favourable in terms of promoting confidence that 
shareholder expectations for financial performance will be met, may lead to shareholder 
apathy as shareholders are ‘overwhelmed by the “we know best” ’ (White & Mazur, 1995, p. 
219) attitude of management.  This further promotes an asymmetrical worldview, as little 
shareholder participation is sought or encountered.  
 
The Nurturer 
 
The nurturer role was an active one, recognising the dynamic nature of the relationship and 
the constant need to maintain the relationship through positive action.   
 
Informant 5:  The relationship with our shareholders is important.  Just like any other 
relationship, if it is not nurtured and treated with due respect, it doesn’t perform.  
 
The key attributes of trust, respect and credibility shaped the role’s implementation. While 
the performance of the other company roles was often highly visible, the nurturer role was 
described as invisible to those not directly involved in the relationship building process.   
Therefore, support for the role had to be constantly reinforced by the communicators to those 
in power. 
 
Informant 4:  Their (shareholders) respect in the company is fragile.  It is something 
that is not seen and if it is positive, it is very valuable but if you are negative about it, 
it takes a long while to gain that respect, so it is something that is important but you 
can’t always see it. 
 
The importance of the nurturer role was related to the fragility of the shareholder relationship.  
Any perceived action or inaction by the company could damage the relationship.  Nurturing 
the relationship was difficult and time consuming, whereas damaging the relationship was 
easily done and very difficult to recover from in the short term.     
 
The nurturer role presented difficulties for the financial communicators as it required a 
personal approach in what was often an impersonal environment.  Many shareholders were  
‘unknown’ to the company and, therefore, those that were known often received more 
nurturing than others.  In many cases, this favoured group was the institutional investors 
because they were ‘known’  which helps explain the often practised discrimination between 
the ‘two worlds of investors’ (Mahoney, 1991, p. 64), the institutional and individual 
investors.    
 
The symmetrical worldview supports the nurturing of relationships (White & Mazur, 1995, p. 
22) by bringing parties closer together, through understanding and co-operation (McElreath, 
1996).  Building long-term, trusting relationships by engaging in genuine dialogue 
(McElreath, 1996) is a key aspect of the symmetrical approach.  This approach was evident in 
the nurturer role, however, the primary motivation was still to protect the company’s position 
in the relationship.  This reflects the ‘mixed-motive’ form of symmetrical communication 
(Murphy, 1991) where both sides pursue their own interests while still recognising that the 
relationship must be satisfactory to both sides. 
 
The Outsider 
 
While the purpose of investor relations has been described as ‘ensuring investors consider 
themselves internal, rather than associated or external publics’ (Crable & Vibbert, 1986, p. 
143), the positioning of shareholders in this study was that of outsiders.  The shareholders 
were seen as external to the company and often remote from its operations and management.  
Thus,  spatial locality positioned shareholders as outsiders.    
 
Informant 2:  I guess the general view is that shareholders are out there somewhere 
and we are in here somewhere. 
 
This positioning provided support for the representational democracy model inherent in the 
Australian public company structure.  The shareholders were outsiders, represented by the 
Board of Directors who were insiders.  
 
Informant 7:  Shareholders are external, without a doubt.  The way I see it is that 
shareholders delegate responsibilities to the Board of Directors, who in turn delegate 
responsibilities to employees, who then have an accoutability back up the line.  So we 
do see them (shareholders) as external.   
 
Such delegation made the outsider shareholders dependent upon the insider Directors and 
management for the disclosure of key information.  As outlined in the informer role, there 
was strong recognition of the selective nature of the disclosure process which could be seen to 
equally work towards preserving management as protecting shareholder interests. 
 
A further dimension of the outsider role involved the anonymous and transient nature of the 
shareholders.  This characterisation was somewhat problematic for the informants as it 
provided further support for the division between institutional shareholders, who were known 
to the company, and the individual shareholders, who were anonymous.  Thus, there were 
categories of outsiders within outsiders.  Building relationships with shareholders was 
challenging in itself, however, the challenge grew when the other party was not known or did 
not appear to be actively engaged in the relationship itself.  The anonymous and inactive 
nature of many shareholders supported the notion of the ‘passive’ shareholder (Deetz, 1992).   
 
The positioning of shareholders as anonymous and transient outsiders promotes the 
asymmetrical worldview as it reduces the importance of the shareholder body in relation to 
the company and the knowledge base of such a body.  This justifies the role of the ‘elites’ in 
the organisation who have more knowledge than the outsiders (McElreath, 1996).  The 
inherent difficulty in building relationships with unknowns can move organisations towards 
more efficient uses of resources, working with the knowns and concentrating resources on 
their internal management processes. 
    
The Participator 
 
The participator role supported the traditional view of the passive shareholder (Deetz, 1992).  
The listed companies favoured representational forms of participation (Pateman, 1970). 
Barber (1948 in Deetz, 1992) suggests that representation destroys participation in democratic 
systems.  This may help to explain how little participation in the company was expected of 
shareholders and, therefore, creating opportunities for greater participation was not given high 
priority. 
 
The direct participatory role of shareholders was conceptualised in two ways.  The first was 
financial participation through the provision of dividends.  The other major form of 
participation was through feedback.  The listed companies reported their actions to 
shareholders and the shareholders responded. 
 
As the current arrangements for participation through feedback were so widely supported, the 
companies were not actively seeking ways to expand participation in their companies.  Some 
of the informants alluded to more participation, but this was directly related to more 
feedback. 
 
Informant 2:  As far as participation, what I would like to see from shareholders is 
more feedback, more communication.  A lot of them tend to just sit there and don’t 
make any comment. 
 
The informants suggested that any change to the current arrangements would have to be 
prompted by the shareholders.  Participation was seen as the choice of shareholders who 
equally had the choice not to participate.  This relieved the company of any responsibility to 
actively seek the involvement of shareholders. 
 
Informant 7:  Shareholders can take a back seat if they want and others can be more 
involved and they do.  The risk return associated with that methodology is theirs.  It is 
their choice. 
 
As outlined above, shareholder participation was only expected as part of an action-response 
sequence, triggered by the company.  Shareholder activism worked outside this approach, 
which may explain the negative connotations associated by the companies to such activism.  
Shareholders were seen as becoming more demanding,  which was recognised as a right of 
ownership, but still viewed negatively by the companies.   
 
Through activism, shareholders were seen to be gaining power.  The demonstration of such 
power, highlighted by recent cases such as demands for the resignation of the chairman of 
BHP, was not expected by the companies.   
 
Passive shareholders were associated with well performing operations, whereas active 
shareholders reflected ‘things going wrong’ (Informant 7).  Once again, this associated 
negative consequences with shareholder participation.   
 
Informant 4:  If we conduct ourselves where shareholders are always agitating, we 
know we are doing something wrong.  Now just because shareholders are not 
agitating, it doesn’t mean we are necessarily doing it 100% right but we are not doing 
a lot of things wrong.  It is not in our interests or in shareholders’ interests for any 
shareholder groups to be agitating. 
 
The limited approaches to participation and the limited interest in pursuing further means of 
participation do not suggest strong support for the symmetrical worldview.  The direct 
participation of shareholders in decision-making and direction setting is not being sought, 
however, if particular shareholders show interest in greater involvement, the companies 
appear to deal with the matters on a case by case basis.  When combined with the informants’ 
strong views on the leader role, the shareholder participator is reduced to a responder role 
whose views may or may not be taken into consideration in future planning.  Under the 
asymmetrical worldview, change is undesirable and outside pressure for change is considered 
subversive and should be resisted (McElreath, 1996).  This may help to explain the negative 
connotations attached to shareholder activism which is pressing for change in a range of 
company activities.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The typology of roles which emerged from the study suggests the listed companies’ behaviour 
is closely aligned with the asymmetrical worldview where limited participation of parties is 
encouraged.  An asymmetrical approach may lead to a focus on effectiveness strategies within 
organisations (Deetz, 1992).  Effectiveness strategies view communicative acts as a means to 
accomplish the desired ends and focus more on the transfer of meaning as defined by the 
organisation.  The effectiveness strategy is designed to achieve control through 
communication, further promoting the power base of the organisation (McElreath, 1996).   
The need for control was highlighted in a number of the roles, particularly the informer and 
leader. 
 
While the symmetrical worldview has been suggested as the best approach to building long 
term, mutually beneficial relationships (McElreath, 1996), it is recognised as a normative 
theory of how public relations should be practised (Grunig & Grunig, 1992) rather than 
describing actual practice.   As questions of shareholder participation are central to any shift 
towards the idealised state of symmetrical communication, the informants’ difficulty 
envisaging participation outside the current limited practice questions the likelihood of such a 
shift in the near future.   
 
The negative connotations attached to the greater participation of shareholders suggested a 
defensive stance against shareholder involvement, rather than any encouragement of it.  
Tourish (1998) describes participation as ‘the institutionalisation of dissent’ (p. 106).  If 
shareholder activism is the manifestation of such dissent in the listed company-shareholder 
relationship, it does not appear to be institutionalised by the companies themselves.  Instead, 
it is portrayed as negative to the health of the companies and strategies are being taken to 
reduce such activism.  This strongly reflects the asymmetrical worldview where the 
conservative nature of the organisation works to subdue any external pressure for change 
(McElreath, 1996). 
 
Further research is needed on the participatory roles of shareholders in listed companies.  
With more Australians investing in the stockmarket, the time may be right to challenge the 
assumptions of the ‘passive’ shareholder (Deetz, 1992).  As the current structure promotes 
representative participation, some value has been placed on this type of participation.  To 
challenge this, a higher value needs to be placed on other forms of participation to encourage 
the necessary change in approach.  Whether this change is desirable and whether it would be 
company led or shareholder led are questions to be explored in further research. 
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